Calls to to ban FSX coming in: 3, 2, 1...

[Paughco]

I am officially bailing from this thread before we hear from Dudley. The next sound you hear will be your own echo.

Seeya
ATB

[DHenriques_]

I am officially bailing from this thread before we hear from Dudley. The next sound you hear will be your own echo.

Seeya
ATB

This event was a crime. There is no question that can be raised as to pilot responsibility.That is a known. Everybody by all means feel free to discuss the event (in the right place of course) and in good taste.
We are only concerned here at A2A with discussion after an accident where speculation is rendered through opinion as to cause while the NTSB has not rendered a decision as to pilot responsibility.
Not relevant in this event.

Dudley Henriques

[Tutmeister]

Well another option would be perhaps to put a coded throttle limiting lock on aircraft so they could have enough power to move around an airfield on the ground but not have enough power to takeoff and also in conjunction with or perhaps without coded flight control locks.All of these could be accessed by authorised pilots.This would exclude the ground personnel with perhaps a few other authorised higher ups.

Also perhaps have aircraft anti tampering cameras in the cockpit for evidence purposes for prosecution and add some new heavy criminal law and civil penalties for tampering.
Maybe better better employee monitoring like with GPS tracking.Hire more security to watch over and monitor employees.

I dont feel that either of these would fix the issue. Firstly cameras and penalties - this guy never had any intention of landing. Sad state of affairs but he was joking about it with atc. He already knew if he came back he was going away. Increasing the penalty and evidence collecting for someone who is already broken achieves nothing. coding an aircraft only stops unauthorised users from doing something. Authorised people like pilots can and do this sort of stuff usually with worse consequences. Also the cost involved in doing this and the chance of it stopping somebody who already has access to aircraft are slight. I doubt a single minded focused person wanting to do this wouldn't be able to find out the combination. So many pilots would need to know it that it would be common knowledge before long. Just like coded door locks soon get shared out!

Then there is the fact that the chance of this to happen is so slight as there are so few people in the scheme of things that are able to do this. Despite the media this guy knew alot. He started up, taxyed out, took off, put the gear up,tuned the radio, knew about the pressurisation panel. I'm not saying he was an expert but this is way beyond your average punter or someone who says they have played a few video games like he did.

I think less focus should be put on security because it doesnt stop even a pilot from crashing a planes on purpose, and more focus put on mental health and well being issues as Esa said. That comment stands for all big business.

Chris

[JJB17463rdBombGroup]

Well another option would be perhaps to put a coded throttle limiting lock on aircraft so they could have enough power to move around an airfield on the ground but not have enough power to takeoff and also in conjunction with or perhaps without coded flight control locks.All of these could be accessed by authorised pilots.This would exclude the ground personnel with perhaps a few other authorised higher ups.

Also perhaps have aircraft anti tampering cameras in the cockpit for evidence purposes for prosecution and add some new heavy criminal law and civil penalties for tampering.
Maybe better better employee monitoring like with GPS tracking.Hire more security to watch over and monitor employees.

I dont feel that either of these would fix the issue. Firstly cameras and penalties - this guy never had any intention of landing. Sad state of affairs but he was joking about it with atc. He already knew if he came back he was going away. Increasing the penalty and evidence collecting for someone who is already broken achieves nothing. coding an aircraft only stops unauthorised users from doing something. Authorised people like pilots can and do this sort of stuff usually with worse consequences. Also the cost involved in doing this and the chance of it stopping somebody who already has access to aircraft are slight. I doubt a single minded focused person wanting to do this wouldn't be able to find out the combination. So many pilots would need to know it that it would be common knowledge before long. Just like coded door locks soon get shared out!

Then there is the fact that the chance of this to happen is so slight as there are so few people in the scheme of things that are able to do this. Despite the media this guy knew alot. He started up, taxyed out, took off, put the gear up,tuned the radio, knew about the pressurisation panel. I'm not saying he was an expert but this is way beyond your average punter or someone who says they have played a few video games like he did.

I think less focus should be put on security because it doesnt stop even a pilot from crashing a planes on purpose, and more focus put on mental health and well being issues as Esa said. That comment stands for all big business.

Chris

The code could be changed daily or for each scheduled flight by authorized personnel just before the flight and given to the authorized Pilot before his flight.
They were talking instead about a code to start the aircraft instead in the article. Also there could be a daily or scheduled flight different code for the copilot as well.
If only one had the code then it would be a no flight condition and if the other person wasn't there a signal would go out after a short bit of time that something was amiss and would contact the right authorities.
In addition perhaps the airport could have another daily coded authorization but remotely on a frequency hopped transceiver.
Multiple coded authorizations could help a lot. There could be anti tamper functions built into each panel as well so if a mechanic removed the coded panels they could send out a signal that they were being removed.It could be legitimate repair or it could be tampering where the signal would contact the right authorities of it being tampered.
If tampering occurred the authorities with the force that can back up an argument would pay them a quick visit
Tampering could just mean prosecution of personnel attempting unauthorized actions,arrest and immediate termination.

The security problems can be mitigated- somehow.
Otherwise if the commercial air industry is that reluctant about solving the (National Security) problem (due to costs) then it should just be permanently shut down for good.
These is no excuse for security that's deeply flawed as has been exposed by these examples.

[AKar]

The security problems can be mitigated- somehow.
Otherwise if the commercial air industry is that reluctant about solving the (National Security) problem (due to costs) then it should just be permanently shut down for good.
These is no excuse for security that's deeply flawed as has been exposed by these examples.

I am not a believer of such technical solution. For starters, it would be extremely difficult to implement technically so that it satisfies the certified intent of the systems which it would interconnect with. Recall, we are mostly speaking of cables pulling some aluminum here, and what is electrical, needs preferably work predictably on its own without any too networked systems structure (albeit we are going that way with latest generation - with all the related issues!).

What also may be missed here is how much airplanes are actually operated by people other than the flying staff. It is done daily, and systems are often operated in numerous non-standard configurations as pilots might view it, just to get a test or check done, or during steps of troubleshooting, software updates etc. Test runs are performed, and sometimes up to maximum thrust. Systems are sometimes tested in their degraded modes. All this may also need to be done at remote locations, outside the regular hubs, for simple reason that an airplane is a mean to get from A to B and back primarily, and sometimes 'B' is an ugly place.

Each incident is a tragedy of course, but putting all this in perspective, only a very few deaths have been involved with non-authorized people 'stealing' airplanes, being mostly limited to suicidal individuals themselves. I exclude hijacks because they happen after boarding, indicating issues in different security circumstances. On the other hand, if speaking of those as well, a technical solution into perceived threat of unauthorized people entering the cockpit in flight has allowed for a new "internal threat", namely, pilot suicide. After 9/11, 4U9525 and TM470 add up to 183 deaths due to pilot suicide, against which none of this would make any difference, but the last minutes of CVR including banging of the cockpit door, reinforced for the very reason to exclude things like this for happening due to external threats.

Any medicine has its adverse effects, and should be moderated to the minimum. What should be treated for are the problems, not the consequences. Otherwise we end up creating new ones.

-Esa

[JJB17463rdBombGroup]

The security problems can be mitigated- somehow.
Otherwise if the commercial air industry is that reluctant about solving the (National Security) problem (due to costs) then it should just be permanently shut down for good.
These is no excuse for security that's deeply flawed as has been exposed by these examples.

I am not a believer of such technical solution. For starters, it would be extremely difficult to implement technically so that it satisfies the certified intent of the systems which it would interconnect with. Recall, we are mostly speaking of cables pulling some aluminum here, and what is electrical, needs preferably work predictably on its own without any too networked systems structure (albeit we are going that way with latest generation - with all the related issues!).

What also may be missed here is how much airplanes are actually operated by people other than the flying staff. It is done daily, and systems are often operated in numerous non-standard configurations as pilots might view it, just to get a test or check done, or during steps of troubleshooting, software updates etc. Test runs are performed, and sometimes up to maximum thrust. Systems are sometimes tested in their degraded modes. All this may also need to be done at remote locations, outside the regular hubs, for simple reason that an airplane is a mean to get from A to B and back primarily, and sometimes 'B' is an ugly place.

Each incident is a tragedy of course, but putting all this in perspective, only a very few deaths have been involved with non-authorized people 'stealing' airplanes, being mostly limited to suicidal individuals themselves. I exclude hijacks because they happen after boarding, indicating issues in different security circumstances. On the other hand, if speaking of those as well, a technical solution into perceived threat of unauthorized people entering the cockpit in flight has allowed for a new "internal threat", namely, pilot suicide. After 9/11, 4U9525 and TM470 add up to 183 deaths due to pilot suicide, against which none of this would make any difference, but the last minutes of CVR including banging of the cockpit door, reinforced for the very reason to exclude things like this for happening due to external threats.

Any medicine has its adverse effects, and should be moderated to the minimum. What should be treated for are the problems, not the consequences. Otherwise we end up creating new ones.

-Esa

Yes there would have to be nested hierarchical sets of authorization and controls so certain mechanics would need specific codes and authorization for certain systems they worked on so an engine mechanic would have to have no access to certain flight control systems. It would have to have added complexity.
Indeed there have been suicide-murders by Pilots too so nothing is perfect but there should be security improvements.

[AKar]

Yes there would have to be nested hierarchical sets of authorization and controls so certain mechanics would need specific codes and authorization for certain systems they worked on so an engine mechanic would have to have no access to certain flight control systems. It would have to have added complexity.
Indeed there have been suicide-murders by Pilots too so nothing is perfect but there should be security improvements.

I can only see problems.

First, skilled people work with the entire airplane, not on individual systems (even if certain old-fashioned 145s with a few strong, well-paid union people pulling the strings still accustom their less well-paid people to basically work on the left brake and refuse to work on anything else, but that's another story... ). Second, systems are interconnected. Simply bringing the batteries online will start booting various systems from DC main end essentials. This usually includes some flight control systems in airplanes where those are computerized. To open a cargo door the usual way in an A320 series, which I happen to know fairly well, includes powering up the 200 VAC buses and running the yellow system hydraulic pump - the airplane usually is pretty much alive in that state, or at least quickly waking up. If you tow the aircraft, you would be using the same pump to charge up the brake accumulators, often powered by APU which brings the whole thing alive. To have an engine started in it, you need to have the ADIRS 1 & 2 powered for air data parameters the FADEC needs, so simply firing up an engine is linked to the damned navigation systems in this example. Which is just an example!

It is all but impossible to divide the systems or groups of systems by access to their operation.

Further, let us assume we encounter an electrical switching event in flight. Many of the boxes hold no important volatile data, so they simply boot up and carry on when having completed their BIT routines in a second or two. Should we start re-entering various codes into zillion systems in event we lose a generator in flight? If you think about air/ground sensing, forget about it: give me some pieces of tin plate and some duct tape, and I fool the systems into the air at will in most airplanes.

Anyways, in big portion of the flying fleet, many, if not all, fundamental functions of an aircraft are achieved in part or completely mechanically. One could add some locks all over the place, but then, the keys would have to be universal and distributed to just about anyone. Even the cabin cleaning will need an access to the aircraft, including cockpit, at their convenience, not to mention catering, fueling, line servicing, emergency services etc. Control locks, where used, may have (and sometimes do have) keylocks, but again, in commercial service the keys need to be fairly universal, as you don't know who may even be the one flying it the next time, not to mention working on it if the thing breaks down in Abuja or some damned place, and flight crew have lost their keys after having their pockets turned in a bar fight.

Sounds like lots of trouble to prevent extremely isolated cases where human losses, no matter how tragic, are not greater than if poor guys would have turned into services of misters Smith and Wesson, like many others not making much of a headline.

I must stand behind my statement, that the best, and only proper way to prevent as many of such cases as possible is to know your people working in such fields, to look after them and to know how they do. It only makes like tertiary importance if they end up leaving us with an airplane stolen from an apron or a loop of rope made of sheets. People that do reasonably well, or even just regularly bad, don't have too much such ideas of quitting it all in the first place, and even less in ways that directly damage their colleagues and co-workers. People doing well generally do good job as an added bonus. It should be a responsibility of each manager, colleague, co-worker or anyone to have a reasonable feeling of connection with people we work with, and to know in general level how they do. Managers and supervisors like me mostly fail in this miserably, for a big part due to stupid work well-being theater failing to notice the biggest need of a healthy mind: to be meaningful in ways or others, at home and in work. There lies the trick, if only our culture transformed to pay attention instead of creating propaganda not making any difference.

Twelve years in this field have already taught me that aviation as an industry is not in any ways the healthiest one in what comes to the personnel running the whole big circus.

-Esa

[JJB17463rdBombGroup]

Well there should be two coded panels for 2 people to enter the codes that are selected for each specific operation.Codes for flight,codes for certain maintenance,codes for repair .Other situations might not require code access at all for there would be no need for such
At no time should just one person be allowed to be alone working with or on commercial multi passenger aircraft.
This was the flaw with that baggage handler Richard Russell.
If you had two people handle the job the work would be finished in half the time anyway and then that team could do something else.
Ideally it should be a team of 3 so one is less likely to overpower 2 people in another scenario.
Usually there are teams working on the aircraft for testing and repair work isn't that correct?
There should be a supervisor under certain work to ensure maintenance and repair are done correctly.

[dvm]

Like the folks at Krogers always say there ain't no Safeway. Seriously I think we have become a society where safety trumps every other consideration. The law of diminishing returns can be applied in most situations. Everything has risk including manufacturing, power generation and on course Aviation. It is impossible to vet every person to the point where you can guarantee their sanity in every scenario. If you made that the criteria for a person to hold a position of responsibility the world would come to a a screeching halt. You pays your money and you takes your chances.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RbgAApwh4ns

[aonyn]

Like the folks at Krogers always say there ain't no Safeway. Seriously I think we have become a society where safety trumps every other consideration. The law of diminishing returns can be applied in most situations. Everything has risk including manufacturing, power generation and on course Aviation. It is impossible to vet every person to the point where you can guarantee their sanity in every scenario. If you made that the criteria for a person to hold a position of responsibility the world would come to a a screeching halt. You pays your money and you takes your chances.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RbgAApwh4ns[/youtube]

+1 add to this, new rules and regs to guarantee our safety will create further headaches, aggravations, burdens, costs, etc for us, but the nuts with mal intent will always find ways around, new rules will be imposed, and round and round we go.

[Orlaam]

I’m sure I wasn’t the only person here that made the connection between the Orcas statement and Orcas island by orbx. I figured the whales he mentioned were the ones modelled off the end of the runway. I found the whole thing to be very sad. That being said if there’s a way to go out..man.
Some of the maneuvers were nothing short of impressive. I’m sure the guys over at majestic are holding their breath.

Thankfully that's not the case. He was referring to this incident: https://www.theguardian.com/environment ... ton-canada

I still hold firm that he did not use the Majestic or any proper civil aviation platform. I did see where someone mentions recognizing his voice from IL-2. He obviously couldn't confirm, but felt the voice was very familiar. It would explain his desire to perform aerobatics, something that applies more to war birds and air shows.

[caribpilot]

Honestly speaking, given that there are so many violent crimes committed on a regular basis and violent games are not banned, I think flight simulators are pretty safe for now.